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THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CERCLA:
PRE-ENACTMENT RESPONSE COSTS
INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") was hastily written and supplied its
readers with little legislative history.2 Its purpose was to clean up inac-
tive hazardous waste sites that had not been adequately dealt with in the
past. 3 Many courts and commentators consider CERCLA to be an elev-
enth hour compromise, having become law at the end of both a lame
duck Congress and a Presidential term.4 This unfortunate scenario
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), as amended by Act of Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
2. One court has made the following observation:
CERCLA was created in a unique attempt by Congress to mitigate some of the
problems caused by inactive hazardous waste sites. It was hastily, and, there-
fore inadequately drafted. Even the legislative history must be read with cau-
tion since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little or no
explanation. Because of the haste with which CERCLA was enacted, Congress
was not able to provide a clarifying committee report, thereby making it ex-
tremely difficult to pinpoint the intended scope of the legislation.
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (citations omitted), quoted
in Giblin & Kelly, Judicial Development of Standards of Liability in Government Enforce-
ment Actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Giblin & Kelly]. Other
commentators similarly discuss CERCLA:
It [CERCLA] was considered on December 3, 1980, in the closing days of the
lame duck session of an outgoing Congress. It was considered and passed, after
very limited debate, under a suspension of the rules, in a situation which al-
lowed for no amendments. Faced with a complicated bill on a take it-or-leave it
basis, the House took it, groaning all the way.
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
Grad]. "By lack of design due to eleventh-hour compromises and amendments in the
Congress, the Act has much ambiguity and little authoritative legislative history." Com-
ment, CERCLA 1985." A Litigation Update, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10395,
10395 (Dec. 1985). See generally, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1458 (1986); Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs under
CERCLA, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 347 (1985).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119-20. "The bill was intended to provide remedies for envi-
ronmental hazards caused by abandoned or inactive waste disposal sites or facilities." F.
Skillern, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK § 5A.01 at 157
(Supp. 1986). "CERCLA applies primarily to the cleanup of leaking inactive or aban-
doned sites and to emergency responses to spills." F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & A:
TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 568 (1984).
4. Along with commentators mentioned in supra, note 2, see Blaymore, Retroactive
Application of Superfund: Can Old Dogs be Taught New Tricks?, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1985); Freeman, Inappropriate and Unconstitutional Retroactive Application of
Superfund Liability, 42 Bus. LAW 215, 223 (1986) [hereinafter Freeman]. Courts have
continually stated that CERCLA was quickly written, and Congress had little time for
debate. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 368 (1986); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew
Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.N.J. 1985); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.
Supp. 1064, 1069 (D. Colo. 1985) [hereinafter Shell Oil]; United States v. Northeastern
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under which CERCLA became law has led to much disagreement over
which situations and to what extent the statute may be applied against
CERCLA defendants.'
Courts have generally concluded that CERCLA holds responsible par-
ties liable for acts committed before the passage of the statute.6 They
have not, however, been in such accord over whether the liability section
of CERCLA (section 107) 7 holds responsible parties liable for response
costs incurred by the federal government before the passage of CER-
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) [hereinafter
NEPACCO I], rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987) [hereinafter NEPACCO II]; United States
v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.
1300, 1310 n.12 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982).
5. Courts have generally agreed that CERCLA imposes a standard of strict liability.
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985). See also, Bulk
Distribution Centers v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984, 991 n.2 (D.S.C. 1984);
NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. 823, 843 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). Joint and several liability
has also been considered the norm.. See id. at, 845; United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Two courts, however, have held that such liability need not
be applied in every instance. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep.Cas. (BNA) 1912,
1915 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
6. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
839 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. NEPACCO I, 810 F.2d
726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. South Caro-
lina Recycling & Disposal, 653 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Wade,
20 Envt Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1849, 1850 (E.D. Pa. 1984); State ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1314 (N.D. Ohio 1983). But see, Freeman, 42 Bus. LAw 215 (1986):
"In short, there is no express language of Superfund to support liability for pre-enactment
conduct..." Id. at 222. "But while the law is thus continually adding to its specific rules,
it does accept the coarse and impolitic principle that a man acts always at his peril." Id.
at 222, quoting O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 163 (1923).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982), as amended by Act of Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986). The pertinent section that this Note addresses is section 9607(a),
CERCLA section 107(a), which, as amended, reads as follows:
Sec. 107. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law...
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility of which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dispo-
sal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
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CLA.8 The federal circuit courts are divided on the issue of "pre-enact-
ment response costs:9 one group holds that CERCLA should be applied
retroactively to hold responsible parties liable for pre-enactment response
costs ("retroactive" side);1" the other group holds that the liability sec-
tion can only be read to hold responsible parties liable for costs incurred
after the passage of CERCLA ("prospective" side)."
Part I of this Note shall give a brief overview of CERCLA's history.
Part II discusses basic concepts of statutory construction and due process
with respect to section 107. This Note concludes that, because of unclear
legislative history, CERCLA should not be construed to apply to pre-
enactment response costs, and that any such construction results in a
denial of CERCLA defendants' due process rights.
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan [40 C.F.R. sections §§ 300.1-300.86 (1986)];(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resource dam-
ages, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss
resulting from such a release ...
[CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(D) deals with the recovery of interest, which is
not pertinent to the topic of this Note.]
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), reprinted as amended in Env't Rep. (BNA) § 71 at 0720 (Federal
Laws binder, Nov. 28, 1986 update).
8. See infra, notes 9 and 10 for the division of the courts.
9. While no court has explicitly defined the term "pre-enactment response costs,"
the facts from the cases lead to a ready deduction of the term's meaning. In the case of
United States v. Morton-Thiokol, No. 83-4787, slip op. (D.N.J. July 2, 1984) [bench
ruling], the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") began clean-
ing up contaminated groundwater in August, 1980. On December 11, 1980, CERCLA
was enacted. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). While defendant Morton-Thio-
kol may be liable for the costs expended by the DEP from December 11, 1980 onward,
see supra note 6 and accompanying text, the question of whether Morton-Thiokol should
pay for such expenses from August to December 10, 1980, is the subject matter of this
Note. The court in Morton-Thiokol refused to hold the defendant liable for response
costs incurred prior to December 10, 1980.
10. NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. 823, 843 (W.D. Mo. 1984), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom, NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d 726, 737 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Ottati & Goss, 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1398 (D.N.H. 1985);
Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Co., 621 F. Supp. 663, 669 (D.N.J. 1985); United
States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 899 (E.D. N.C. 1985). See also Massachusetts v. Pace,
616 F. Supp. 815, 819 (D. Mass. 1985) (interpreting a state provision similar to CERCLA
section 107); Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1077 (D. Colo. 1985).
11. Nunn v. Chem. Waste Management, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1763, 1766 (D.
Kan. 1985); United States v. Morton-Thiokol, No. 83-4787, slip op. at 6 (D.N.J. July 2,
1984) [bench ruling]; United States v. Wade, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1849, 1853 (E.D.
Pa. 1984). The court's opinion in Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho
1986), suggests that pre-enactment response costs were expended, but not granted. See
id. at 670-2. One court in which this matter is pending has yet to reach a decision.
United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1470 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). See also,
Joint Supplemental Memorandum for Plaintiffs, United States v. Occidental Chem.
Corp., No. 79-990C (W.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 5, 1986).
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I. HISTORY OF CERCLA
CERCLA was enacted to close the gaps in its predecessor statute, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"). 12 Con-
gress envisioned RCRA as the answer to the "last remaining loophole in
environmental law."' 3 RCRA was enacted so that hazardous waste could
be tracked from the moment it was generated to the moment it was dis-
posed.14 RCRA's main purpose, then, was to block the creation of new
hazardous waste sites."5 Prior to RCRA, no statute covered the disposal
of hazardous wastes on land. 6 RCRA failed, however, to provide a stat-
utory basis for cleanup of the many inactive waste sites. 7 Since RCRA
provided no adequate remedy for the cleanup of sites in which operations
ceased years ago,"' Congress began its work on CERCLA.
CERCLA's purpose was to clean up these inactive hazardous waste
sites, 9 especially where the owner or generator could not be found or
could not afford the cleanup costs.2" While several bills reached the
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6241.
14. RCRA has been cited as "a cradle-to-grave" regulatory scheme for toxic wastes
providing nationwide protection against the dangers of improper waste disposal. United
States v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1209 (1985). RCRA's regulatory system is found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (1982), and
40 C.F.R. part 262 (1986).
15. This concept is evidenced by RCRA's "imminent hazard" provision, RCRA
§ 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982), which grants the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") the power to commence suit in federal district court to "restrain persons from
contributing to any waste activities which may present an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to health or the environment." Id.
16. Other environmental statutes in existence in 1976 were as follows: Clean Air Act,
69 Stat. 322 (1955), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1982); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1982); Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
469, 79 Stat. 997 (1965), which RCRA proposed to amend. See RCRA § 2, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6902 (1982).
17. As was stated in CERCLA's House Report, "Since enactment of [RCRA], a ma-
jor new source of environmental concern has surfaced: the tragic consequences of im-
properly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices known as the
'inactive hazardous waste site problem.'. . . Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with
this massive problem." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120. "Under present authority, before
action can be taken to abate releases of hazardous wastes... a problem must already
exist, a financially responsible owner must already exist, and abatement efforts can only
begin after successful judicial action has occurred." 126 CONG. REC. 26780 (1980)(state-
ment of Rep. Dingell).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119.
20. As was stated by Thomas Jorling, Assistant Administrator, Department of Water
and Waste Management of the EPA: "This fund is to be used to find, assess, and, where
warranted, clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites when the company or companies
responsible for creating the problem either no longer exist, cannot be identified, or lack
the financial resources to clean up their own messes." Administration Testimony to the
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floors of both houses between 1977 and 1979,2" the actual bill that be-
came CERCLA, H.R. 7020,22 did not become law until late 1980.23
Congress debated over the exact number of inactive waste sites in exist-
ence in 1980, and generally agreed to a number of 397.24 The amount of
money spent yearly at New York State sites was estimated at $44 bil-
lion.25 The then lame-duck Congress recognized that it was of the utmost
importance to get some form of legislation passed whereby federally
funded cleanup could begin. 26 Since CERCLA was hastily written, Con-
gress agreed that any gaps in the statute would have to be filled in by the
courts or future Congressional bodies.1
The House and Senate versions of the bill2" contained liability provi-
sions that encompassed pre-enactment response costs. 29 These sections,
however, were not included in the final version of CERCLA.3° CER-
CLA as passed did contain a liability provision, section 107(f), with re-
spect to "natural resource damages."31 Section 107(f)3 2 does not apply to
Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection to the Senate Commit-
tee on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 93, cited in Blaymore, Retro-
active Application of Superfund: Can Old Dogs be Taught New Tricks?, 12 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985).
21. See Grad, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 n.3 (1982), for a listing of the seven Senate
bills and the twelve House bills.
22. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 26,757 (1980).
23. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
24. 126 CONG. REC. 26,761 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio).
25. Id. (Letter from the National Association of Attorneys General).
26. In response to an amendment proposed by Rep. Stockman, Rep. Florio stated,
"Time is of the essence in many of these instances. The need is right now." 126 CONG.
REC. 26,761 (1980). As was stated by Rep. Dingell, "[T]he task is large and the stakes
are high, and we must commence with this first and most important step. We have no
more time to delay." 126 CONG. REc. 26,780 (1980).
27. "[I]t would be foolhardy to maintain that all of our hazardous waste ills will be
solved with this one piece of legislation given the scope of the problem facing the Nation.
The magnitude of the problem ... will require the resources and resolve of generations to
come." 126 CONG. REC. 26,780 (1980) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
28. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in I U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHEN-
SIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, at
462 (1983) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980),
reprinted in 2 LEGLISLATIVE HISTORY, at 138 (1983).
29. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. section 4(a)(1)(A), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, at 267 (1983), which provided that responsible parties would be liable for "[A]II
costs of removal, or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a
State. .. "
H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. section 3072, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at
198 (1983), which provided: "The provisions of this subpart.., shall apply to releases of
hazardous waste without regard to whether or not such releases occurred before, or on or
after, the date of the enactment .... "
30. 126 CONG. REC. 31,950 (1980).
31. "Natural resources" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(d)(16) (1982), which includes,
"land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other
such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the United States ... any state or local government, or any foreign govern-
ment . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "Sums recovered shall
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natural resource damages that occurred entirely before the enactment of
the statute. Section 107(f), then, was not to be applied retroactively.33
CERCLA was amended in 1986 by the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA").34 While SARA makes dra-
matic changes in some areas,3" it left section 107(f) intact as per the issue
of retroactivity.36 Nothing in SARA addresses pre-enactment response
costs." ' The most current legislative efforts to amend CERCLA have not
provided interpretative aids to determine the retroactive effect of the stat-
ute.3" It shall be necessary, then, to approach the problem by means of
statutory construction.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Courts generally abhor giving retroactive application to statutes. 39 Jus-
be available for use to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of such natural re-
sources by the appropriate agencies of the Federal Government or the State government
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982), which provides, in pertinent part: "There shall be no
recovery under the authority of subparagraph (C) of subsection (a) of this section where
such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which such damages re-
sulted occurred wholly before December 11, 1980."
33. "This provision allows for recovery only of prospective natural resource dam-
ages." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1980), reprinted in I LEGisLATIVE
HISTORY 145 (1983), quoted in Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.
Idaho 1986).
34. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
35. For a thorough discussion of SARA's provisions, see D. Hayes & C. McKerron,
Superfund II: A New Mandate (A BNA SPECIAL REPORT, 17 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
No. 42 (February 13, 1987 supplemental pamphlet)). See also Atkeson, Goldberg, El-
lrodd, and Connors, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10363 (Dec.
1986) [hereinafter Atkeson], Bayko and Share, Stormy Weather on Superfund Front Fore-
cast as "Hurricane SARA" Hits, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 24, col. 1.
36. See Atkeson, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10363, 10400-01.
37. See id.
38. In Congressional debates on SARA, Rep. Eckart stated that a section on pre-
enactment response costs was not necessary because the courts "are moving in the right
direction in holding polluters accountable." 131 CONG. REC. HI 1,074 (daily ed. Dec. 5,
1985). Rep. Dingell commented that "the courts are currently adequately addressing the
issue." 131 CONG. REc. H1 1,070 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985). In United States v. Occidental
Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1470 (W.D.N.Y. 1985), plaintiffs argued that these statements
meant that all cases following Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985), are what was
meant by "adequately addressing the issue." Plaintiffs' Joint Supplemental Memoran-
dum at 17-18, United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 79-990C (W.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 5, 1986). This argument fails to take into account the decision in Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986). See supra note 10.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Union Pac. R.R.
Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190 (1913); United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 399 (1806). See also 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 41.02 at 247 (Sands 4th ed. 1986) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND], where the
author refers to a statement made by Jeremy Bentham against judicial legislation in the
English common law: "[Hue likened it to 'dog law,' referring to the age-old method of
training dogs by waiting until they do what they are forbidden to do, and kicking them."
Id., citing J. BOWRING, WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM v, 235 (1962).
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tice Story best defined the term "retroactive statute" in the following
manner:
[E]very statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past, must be deemed retrospective.' °
Throughout our country's legal history, courts have refused to give retro-
active effect to statutes unless expressly provided for in the statute, or
when such an inference can be drawn from a reading of the statute's
legislative history.4' For a statute to be applied retroactively, the intent
for such application has to be clear.4 2
No provision in CERCLA or SARA provides for retroactive applica-
tion of pre-enactment response costs. 43 The retroactive application of
CERCLA or SARA, therefore, must flow from clear Congressional in-
tent evidenced in the legislative history.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The retroactive courts interpret CERCLA's legislative history to say
that the statute was intended to be "backward-looking." ' The courts
reason that the statutory intention was to go back and clean up inactive
waste sites.4 - Because CERCLA is a remedial statute," all of its provi-
sions must be applied against past conduct, unless the statute specifically
40. Soc'y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.
N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156). The terms "retrospective" and "retroactive" are interchangea-
ble. 2 SUTHERLAND § 41.01 at 245 (Sands 4th ed. 1986).
41. 2 SUTHERLAND § 41.04 at 252 (Sands 4th ed. 1986); United States v. Security
Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982) ("A retrospective operation will not be given to a
statute... unless such be 'the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the
manifest intention of the legislature.' ") (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock
Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913); "Words in a statute ought not to have a retrospec-
tive operation, unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning can
be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satis-
fied." United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 412 (1806).
42. 2 SUTHERLAND §'41.04 at 253 (Sands 4th ed. 1986).
43. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
44. United States v. Ottati & Goss, 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1398 (D.N.H. 1985); Mayor of
Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.N.J. 1985); United States v.
Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 898 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D.
Colo. 1985).
45. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6122.
46. NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146
(1987); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 666 (D.N.J. 1985);
United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 892 (E.D.N.C. 1985). "Some laws are necessar-
ily retrospective, such as laws.., relating to remedies." 2 SUTHERLAND § 41.02 at 248,
quoting Richardson v. Scignlinsky, 9 N.J. Misc. 370, 371, 154 A. 541, 541 (1931). But see
State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 n.7, where the court stated,
"[lit can hardly be contended ... that this statute involves remedial legislation ...
CERCLA creates an entirely new procedure for enforcing substantive rights -a procedure
which was thepurpose for enacting the statute."
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excludes such an application.47
The interpretation of CERCLA as a backward-looking statute is not
surprising. As the prospective courts reason, however, application of the
retroactive argument to its logical limits makes all statutes legitimately
retroactive.4 No statute would be written if some past occurrence had
not prompted its necessity. As Professor Sutherland reasoned:
All laws... have connections with the past. Legislators, no less than
judges, make decisions based on knowledge and understanding gained
from awareness of past facts, since that only can be known which is
history, and the future can only be the subject of guess."
Courts have addressed the removal of the pre-enactment liability pro-
visions from both bills (section 3072 from H.R.7020, ° and section 4(n)
from S. 1480)."' The main point the retroactive courts make is that since
Congress deliberately included a section that denied retroactive applica-
tions for natural resource damages, it implicitly excluded any limitation
on the recovery of response costs.52 This argument draws a distinction
between response costs and natural resource damages."
The retroactive argument clashes with the basic common law tenet
that if Congress is silent on an issue, that issue cannot be applied retroac-
tively unless a strong intent to the contrary can be gathered from the
legislative history.54 The retroactive side, under the guise of interpreting
47. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1079 (D. Colo. 1985).
48. "All statutes are enacted to remedy present effects. If present effects were deter-
minative of retroactivity, no statute could ever be construed as retroactive." United
States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1912, 1914 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
49. 2 SUTHERLAND § 41.02 at 248 (Sands 4th ed. 1986).
50. See supra note 27.
51. See supra note 28. The retroactivity side argues that the basic meaning of section
4(n) was upheld in the statute as passed. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1079 (D. Colo.
1985).
52. Where Congress has intended a liability provision to have only prospective
operation, as in the case of natural resource damages, Congress has so stated
explicitly (citations omitted). Congress did not explicitly limit or deny liability
for response costs incurred before enactment ... I conclude that CERCLA
authorizes recovery of pre-enactment response costs.
Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1079 (D. Colo. 1985).
53. But cf Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811
F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987). In Continental, the Court held an insurance company liable
for natural resource damages caused by defendant Northeastern Pharmaceutical in
NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987). The
policy was in effect from 1970-1972, when the first releases/damages occurred. Costs to
clean up were not expended until after the policy term had expired. Id. at 1181. The
court considered the cleanup costs to be recoverable "damages" under the defunct policy.
See id. at 1188. While there was a strong dissent in the case, id. at 1193-95 (McMillian,
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), the Eighth Circuit has seemingly retroac-
tively applied natural resource damages by equating them to response costs. This deci-
sion runs afoul of the standard most recently discussed in Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635
F. Supp. 665, 675 (D. Idaho 1986), that natural resource damages are not recoverable to
the extent they occurred pre-CERCLA. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982), as amended
by Act of Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
54. 2 SUTHERLAND § 41.04 at 252 (Sands 4th ed. 1986).
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legislative history, is merely interpreting the statute to serve its purposes.
The prospective side, however, gives added weight to the removal of the
sections in its argument that Congress did not intend a retroactive appli-
cation of pre-enactment response costs." The thrust of the argument lies
in the fact that the issue involved millions of dollars.56 Congress, being
aware of the costs here, would have included a section on pre-enactment
response costs had it wished to do so. 7
The prospective argument is supported by the lack of any definite in-
ferences that can be drawn from the legislative history. 8 For every ret-
roactive interpretation, a reader can find an equally convincing
prospective argument. Keeping in mind the courts' general disdain for
retroactive statutes,59 the prospective argument becomes more persua-
sive. Since courts have been accepting both arguments,6" it will be neces-
sary to discuss an area upon which the courts are loathe to tread - due
process. 6 '
55. United States v. Wade, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1849, 1851 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
The Wade court makes reference to statements made by Senators Bradley and Moynihan
regarding the Love Canal and Elizabeth, New Jersey sites, respectively, wherein no com-
ment is made on pre-enactment response costs. Id., citing 126 CONG. REC. 30,937-40
(1980). While the Wade court did not mention the following excerpts from the Congres-
sional debates, the statements further the argument that Congress was aware of the costs
involved, including retroactive applications of liability provisions:
Of particular concern to me and a number of my colleagues on the Commerce
Committee during development of this legislation were the liability issues. Es-
pecially difficult were the ramifications of retroactive application of statutory
liability provisions to past activities of potential defendants. The committee re-
jected any notion of absolute liability in this regard. While the bill [H.R. 7020]
does contain provisions holding defendants who caused or contributed to re-
lease resulting in occurrence of cleanup costs by the administrator strictly,
jointly, and severally liable for such costs, certain important defenses and safe-
guards were provided in the interest of due process...
126 CONG. REC. 26,785 (1980) (statement of Rep. Madigan). "[T]he point about the
disincentive, that we need to put on a fee or some kind of retroactive liability is raised
over and over again." Id. at 26,766 (1980) (statement of Rep. Stockman). The debates
also suggest that SARA was to operate in a prospective manner only. "[E]ffective after
the date of enactment of these amendments, a party who receives an order can begin the
work of environmental cleanup." 132 CONG. REC. H9,624 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (state-
ment of Rep. Eckart).
56. See supra note 26.
57. United States v. Wade, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1849, 1851 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
United States v. Morton-Thiokol, No. 83-4787, slip. op. at 5 (D.N.J. July 2, 1984) [bench
ruling].
58. See Freeman, 42 Bus. LAW. 215, 223 (1986).
59. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 9 and 10.
61. The Supreme Court holds to the "cardinal principle that [it] will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the constitutional ques-
tion may be avoided." United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982), citing
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978), (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
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IV. DUE PROCESS
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in
part, that "No person... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." '62 One of the main concepts that the due
process clause covers is the avoidance of penalizing parties for past con-
duct.63 CERCLA defendants argue that they are being penalized for dis-
posing of materials during a time in which such disposal was not
forbidden." Courts, however, have few criteria for determining when a
statute violates due process.6"
The standard to be applied in most due process cases is whether Con-
gress had a rational basis in applying legislation retroactively.66 There
must be a "rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed."'" The root of the problem at hand is that Congress is
not applying the statute here.6" It has left that job up to the courts and
the EPA.69 The rational basis test may not be the standard to be applied
in this situation, and it undoubtedly could be a more onerous test.' °
Courts have been quite unwilling to address this question."
Courts, when dealing with the constitutional issues, may have to bal-
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.9 at 387 (3d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
64. The concept of Bentham's "dog law" is apparent. See supra note 39.
65. NOWAK § 11.09 at 384 (3d ed. 1986).
66. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
67. Mobile v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910), cited in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
68. Freeman, 42 Bus. LAW. 215, 225 n.29 (1986).
69. See supra note 26.
70. While courts generally give great deference to administrative agencies by applying
a rational basis test to the agencies' interpretations of federal statutes and regulations,
Chem. Manufacturers Ass'n v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125
(1985), this deference "only sets the framework for judicial analysis;'it does not displace
it." Securities In'y Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed'l Reserve System, 468 U.S.
137, 143 (1984), citing United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982),
(quoting United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. -546, 550 (1973)). Furthermore, the "def-
erence owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which
results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly
made by Congress." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms v. Fed'l Labor Relations
Authority, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983), (quoting Am'n Ship Building Co. v. Nat'l Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)). One commentator considered the retroactive appli-
cation of CERCLA to be worthy of congressional attention. See Freeman, 42 Bus. LAW.
215, 225 (1986).
71. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). The Supreme
Court applied a rational basis test in this case, and refused to consider other interests, or
question the wisdom of Congress. See also NOWAK, § 11.9 at 390. The main problem
with applying the rational basis test here is that Congress is not the entity being tested.
Rather, the EPA, a wing of the executive branch, and the court system are the parties to
be put under a due process analysis. While the courts defer to the legislative history
regarding retroactive applications, when the legislative history is inconclusive, the courts
may have to turn to balancing competing interests in their due process analysis. Cf
NOWAK, § 11.9 at 390 (3d ed. 1986).
[Vol. I
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
ance the competing interests involved.72 The courts favoring retroactivity
argue that there is no way CERCLA defendants could have limited their
liability, if they were to have known that the statute would be passed and
applied retroactively.73 Therefore, there is no element of unfair surprise.
However, it is arguable that CERCLA defendants could have performed
the cleanup for much less than the government's costs, so as to negate all
amounts spent pre-CERCLA. Courts must consider the expectations of
CERCLA defendants within the pre-CERCLA time frame before deter-
mining such extensive liability.74
The retroactive side proposes a second, and stronger, argument which
sounds in public policy. The retroactive side argues that it is unfair to
punish the government for acting quickly to aid the public.'" While this
argument has substantial weight, there is an equally strong argument
that the government cannot be presumed to have expected to be reim-
bursed under a statute that was not yet in existence.76 This argument is
further supported by the fact that CERCLA carried no provisions in this
area,77 and the interpretations from the legislative history have yet to
settle the matter.78 It would be even more dubious to expect the EPA to
have acted in reliance upon future interpretations of legislative history.
The arguments posed on either side counteract one another in the due
process area.79 Even a rational basis test may not be proper under these
circumstances.80 In light of this standoff, the retroactive application of
CERCLA response costs must be denied as violative of CERCLA de-
fendants' due process rights.
72. See supra note 71.
73. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985). The Shell court saw no due
process questions involved with respect to pre-enactment response costs, since it had al-
ready considered the retroactive application of liability for pre-enactment conduct not to
run afoul of due process. Id. at 1072.
74. See NOWAK, § 11.9 at 390 (3d ed. 1986).
75. Massachusetts v. Pace, 616 F. Supp. 815, 819 (D. Mass. 1985); Shell Oil, 605 F.
Supp. 1064, 1076 (D. Colo. 1985).
76. See United States v. Wade, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1849, 1851 (E.D. Pa.
1984), where the court, while holding that pre-enactment response costs were not recov-
erable, granted that "[i]n a sense, failure to impose such liability penalizes those who
responded promptly to hazardous sites prior to CERCLA."
77. Id., at 1851 n.2.
78. See supra notes 36-38 and 42.
79. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
80. While the government end in creating CERCLA is clearly proper, the fact that
there is no legislation or irrebuttable legislative history means that the standard "ra-
tional basis" test from Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), may not
be applicable in this situation. It is the legislation from Congress which must satisfy the
test. When there is no legislation, there is no authority as to what test to apply. Perhaps
the previously mentioned balancing test would be appropriate. If this were the case, the
balance would swing in favor of CERCLA defendants, as no argument can be presented
that cannot be refuted.
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CONCLUSION
Courts exercise judicial restraint in cases where constitutional issues
may be involved."1 With regard to CERCLA, courts have refused to
adequately address the constitutional issues, preferring to travel more
traditional paths.8 2 These other paths, however, have proved to be insuf-
ficient to solve the questions CERCLA poses, particularly with respect to
retroactive application of pre-enactment response costs. While the recent
trend of the courts has been toward retroactive application, 3 the cases
on that side have been contradictory in their analyses.8 4 The prospective
argument, however, remains logical and consistent. Many of these cases
may take years before they are finally decided, 5 but when the courts of
appeal, and perhaps the Supreme Court, deal with this issue in earnest,
they must address the due process questions. Only when courts seriously
deal with this constitutional issue can CERCLA defendants be guaran-
teed their due process rights.
James A. Resila
81. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1912, 1915
(C.D. Cal. 1987) ("The Court will not address the issue of whether CERCLA § 107 is
unconstitutional on its face.").
83. Compare supra notes 9 and 10, and the dates of the opinions. But cf Idaho v.
Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986), which acts as a deviation from the
recent trend.
84. See supra note 52, where the court in Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), resulted in a break from the
previous understanding that natural resource damages and response costs are separate.
See also NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146
(1987), where the court clearly states that the "language used in the key liability provi-
sion, CERCLA section 107 .... refers to actions and conditions in the past tense," mean-
ing that since the language is in the past tense, retroactive applications were intended.
But see Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (D. Colo. 1985), where the court concluded
that Congressional intent on this issue could not be gathered from the verb tenses in
CERCLA section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). Accord, Mayor of Boonton v.
Drew Chem. Co., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668 (D.N.J.1985).
85. The NEPACCO I decision, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), was handed down
on January 31, 1984, while the NEPACCO II decision, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987), was not delivered until December 31, 1986.
